SECOND DIVISION
JOSEFINA TEOTICO (ALSO G.R.
No. 147464
KNOWN AS BABY SANTANA),
Petitioner, Present
:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA
and
GARCIA, JJ.
ROSARIO D. BAER,
Respondent. Promulgated :
June 8, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
Before
us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the resolutions[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated August 11, 2000 and March 9, 2001 in CA-G.R. No. 60052.
The
facts show that on October 21, 1997 respondent filed before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) an amended complaint for specific
performance, damages and attorney’s fees against petitioner Josefina Teotico (also known as Baby Santana), as the administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Francisco
D. Santana. Petitioner allegedly refused
to execute an absolute deed of sale in respondent’s favor despite complete
payment of a residential lot located in Pateros, Rizal which was sold to her by the petitioner’s husband,
Francisco Santana, who died during the pendency of
the case.
On
May 25, 1998, the HLURB rendered judgment by default against petitioner for her
failure to file her answer to the complaint despite the proper service of
summons. The dispositive
portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of complainant and against respondent ordering the latter to:
1. Issue the Deed of Absolute Sale free from all liens
encumbrances in favor of complainant of Lot 14, Block 2 of TCT No. 21165 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig;
2. Pay complainant the amount of P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
3. Pay complainant the amount of P30,000.00 as
moral damages;
4. Pay the complainant as attorney’s fees of (sic)
P50,000.00 [;and]
5. Cost of the suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[2]
On August 13, 1998, the HLURB issued
a writ of execution of its decision but petitioner refused to comply with
it. In her opposition[3]
to respondent’s motion for execution and satisfaction of decision,[4]
petitioner argued that the HLURB decision was null and void because respondent
allegedly failed to prove petitioner was appointed as the administratrix
of the estate of her late husband, Francisco Santana, and that there was no
valid service of summons on her, among other things. The HLURB, however, denied petitioner’s
opposition for being “dilatory and without merit.”[5]
On
September 4, 2000, petitioner went up to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
judgment by default dated May 25, 1998 rendered by the HLURB and its order
dated June 14, 2000 directing the enforcement of the judgment by default, for
having allegedly been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
In
a two-page decision, the CA dismissed the petition:
x x x x x x x x x
The
petition alleges that there is no appeal, or any other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law considering that
under Section 1, Rule IV of the 1996 Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board, a motion for reconsideration of any order or decision of
the arbiter is a prohibited pleading.
Worthy
of note, however, [is] that Section 1, Rule XII of the same Rules of Procedure
provides for the remedy of petition for review of the arbiter’s decision within
thirty (30) calendar [days] from receipt thereof. And, in the event of another adverse
decision, the aggrieved party may still appeal to the Office of the President
(Section 2, Rule XVIII).
As
held in Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 198, 219:
“xxx Basic is the rule which has been consistently held by this Court in a long line of cases that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. xxx”
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the above decision alleging that the 30-day period for
filing a petition for review before the HLURB and to appeal to the Office of
the President, had already elapsed when she learned of the judgment of default
rendered against her. She further argued that she immediately went to the CA
because there was an urgent need for judicial intervention due to the patent
nullity of the HLURB judgment.
The
CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It ruled:
Section
1, Rule XII of the Rules of Procedure of the HLURB provides for the remedy of
petition for review of the Arbiter’s decision within thirty (30) calendar days
from receipt thereof. In view of petitioner’s claim that she learned of the
judgment by default against her only when she received a copy of the motion for
execution dated July 14, 1998, then the thirty-day period would be reckoned
from the date when she allegedly received a copy of said motion.
Moreover,
Section 26 of the 1987 Rules of Procedure of the HLURB provides that pending
resolution of the petition for review of the decision of the Arbiter, the Chief
Executive Officer or, in his absence, any Commissioner may, upon motion by
either party, issue interlocutory or ancillary remedies such as but not limited
to temporary restraining orders and/or preliminary injunctions, if in his
judgment the Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the motion
is complete in form and substance and the issue will become moot and academic
or the final judgment ineffectual if no action is made thereon. Consequently,
petitioner had a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
which she, however, did not pursue. Settled is the rule that certiorari cannot
be used as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal especially if
such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s neglect or error in the choice of
remedies. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 376, 383).
WHEREFORE,
the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The
thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts
must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence. Reasons of law,
comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for
determination by administrative agencies.[8]
The HLURB is the sole regulatory body
for housing and land development.[9]
It is charged with encouraging greater private sector participation in low-cost
housing through liberalization of development standards, simplification of
regulations and decentralization of approvals for permits and licenses.[10]
The HLURB has established rules of procedure in the adjudication of the cases
before it. Any party who is aggrieved by its decision “may file with the
Regional Office a verified petition for review of the arbiter’s decision within
30 calendar days from receipt thereof.”[11]
The regional officer shall then elevate the records to the Board of Commissioners
together with the summary of proceedings before the arbiter within 10 calendar
days from receipt of the petition.[12] If the party is still dissatisfied with the
decision of the Board, he may appeal to the Office of the President within 15 calendar
days from receipt of the decision.[13]
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, recourse through court action cannot prosper until
after all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted.[14]
If remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before resort can be made to courts.[15]
It is settled that non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the
Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.[16]
Here, petitioner failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies when she directly elevated to the CA the HLURB
arbiter’s decision without appealing it first to the Board and then later, the
Office of the President. She has failed to convince us that her case is one of
those exempted from the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.[17] Her petition must necessarily fall.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
W E C O N C U R :
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the 10th Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 33-34.
[2] Penned by Atty. Rowena C. Balasolla, Housing and Land Use arbiter, approved by Dunstan T. San Vicente, Head Legal Division, HLURB, Quezon City, rollo, pp. 64-65.
[3] Rollo,
p. 73.
[4] Rollo,
p. 70.
[5] Order,
rollo, p. 82.
[6] CA
decision, rollo, pp. 33-34.
[7] Order, rollo, pp. 36-37.
[8] Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106028, 9 May 2001, 357 SCRA 599.
[9] Executive Order No. 90 – Identifying the Government Agencies Essential for the National Shelter Program and Defining Their Mandates, Creating the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council , Rationalizing Funding Sources and Lending Mechanisms for Home Mortgages and Other Purposes.
[10] Id.
[11] Rule XII, Section 1, Board of Commissioners Resolution No. R-586, Series of 1996, Adopting the 1996 Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
[12] Id.
[13] Rule XVIII, Section 2, id.
[14] Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 25 (2001).
[15] Id.
[16] Castro v. Gloria, 415 Phil. 645 (2001).
[17] Instances when the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; and, (9) in quo warranto proceedings. Castro v. Gloria, 415 Phil. 645 (2001).